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THE U.S. EPA ADMINISTRATOR'S ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL
PENALTIES: A REVIEW OF THE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATOR'S REGULATIONS
RICHARD R. WAGNER*
Across the United States of America, in ten specifically identified
regions,' and in Washington, D.C., certain designated officials of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("U.S. EPA") issue documents
identified as "complaints" or "proposed penalty orders" against those charged
with violating environmental statutes, giving notice to the person so charged
that a civil penalty will be assessed for the person's wrong-doing.2 These
cases may be resolved quickly, but more often go through a pre-trial litigation
process during which an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") presides;3 if the
case is not settled during that process, it is tried before the Presiding Officer.4
If the person is found to have committed violations of an environmental
statute, the case is concluded, administratively, by a final order of the U.S.
EPA Administrator, directing that the person pay the penalty she is assessing
in the final order.
This article has two objectives. First, Part I identifies the
constitutional and statutory sources that authorize the U.S. EPA
Administrator to exercise the authority discussed above. Second, Part II
identifies the applicable law and the steps taken by the Administrator in her
exercise of this authority, intended to affect and control the actions of her
officers and employees, which will culminate in a final order of the
Administrator-an order that, if appealed, the Administrator must be
prepared to defend on administrative review before the appropriate Federal
Court. Part III contains some observations concerning the Administrator's
exercise of her penalty assessment authority within the context of the
language of the law and regulations reviewed.
" Associate Regional Counsel, Region 5. Any opinion herein expressed is that of the
writer and not necessarily that of the Administrator, the Agency, or the United States.
See 40 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1996).
2 See id. § 22.14.
See Administrative Procedure Act § 556, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(1994).
' See 40 C.F.R. § 22.04(c). The Presiding Officer is an ALJ appointed by the Chief ALJ
to conduct certain aspects of the litigation. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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I. THE AUTHORITY
The government of the United States of America, of which the U.S.
EPA is a part, is not a loose entity existing for the purpose of interfering with
the freedom of certain individuals within its geographical boundaries.
Rather, it is a constitutionally established authority created by "We the
People," that has been provided the power and invested with the duty to,
among other things, "promote the general welfare" of the people.5
To "promote the general welfare" of the people, Congress, as a body
of representatives of the people, has exercised its authority under Article I of
the U.S. Constitution and has passed laws to protect the environment in
which the people live as well as the health and well-being of the people from
hazardous and toxic substances.6 Under the authority of Article II of the U.S.
Constitution, the President signed these laws; and, as Chief Executive
Officer, he is invested with a duty and provided with the authority to execute
these laws. Toward that end, the President appoints a person to be the U.S.
EPA Administrator.7
A review of the environmental statutes discussed in this article'
reveals that the Administrator is provided specific authority to enforce
compliance with each statute thereby ensuring that the public health and the
environment are protected. The enforcement powers provided in particular
environmental statutes9 includes the authority of the Administrator to assess
a civil penalty."° Under each of these statutes, when the Administrator finds
U.S. CONST. preamble.
6 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1994); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b) (1994).
5 U.S.C.S. § 903 (Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 §1(b)) (1994).
8 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.01 for a list of statutes covered by the Consolidated Rules of Practice
Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties.
9 See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)-(c), (g) (1994); Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act of 1947, 7 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994); Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (1994); Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3 (1994); Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (1994); Solid Waste
Disposal Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994).
,o See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), (g); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a); 7 U.S.C. § 1361; 42 U.S.C. §
11045; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g); 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a); 42 U.S.C. §§
6928(a), 699le, 6992d (1994); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.31, 22.33-.43.
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the statute has been violated, it is the Administrator that shall assess
penalties; it is the Administrator that shall provide notice of opportunity for
hearing to the person to be assessed the penalty; and, in determining the
amount of civil penalty, it is the Administrator that shall take into account the
statutory penalty criteria." Although these statutes allow for a fact-finding
and remedy selection process 12 that may result in the deprivation of a
violator's "property," the statutes are constitutional. 3
II. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
Pursuant to each of the environmental statutes cited in note nine, the
Administrator is required to provide notice of the proposed administrative
order to the alleged environmental law violator and to provide notice of the
opportunity to request a hearing prior to assessing a penalty. Because each
of these statutes provides that the alleged environmental law violator be given
an "opportunity for an agency hearing," the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") become applicable.14
The APA provides, in part, that:
While each specific statute may vary to some degree in its language, each is clear in
identifying who it is that has the authority to assess a civil penalty for violations: the
Administrator. The Administrator is responsible for giving notice of the opportunity to
request a hearing, and the Administrator must consider the statutory penalty criteria in
determining the amount of penalty to assess. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a), (d), (g); 15
U.S.C. § 2615(a); 7 U.S.C. § 1361; 42 U.S.C. § 11045; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d), (e); 42 U.S.C.
§ 300g-3; 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6991e, 6992d. Section 109 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9609 (1994), actually grants these authorities to the President, who delegates them
to the U.S. EPA Administrator by Executive Order.
2 This does not occur before an Article III court of law, before which there would be
available a full complement of litigant rights, such as a jury trial.
" See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977) (Blackmun, J., not participating), in which the United States Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the assessment of administrative penalties by the Secretary of Labor
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The earlier decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the Secretary of Labor's administrative penalty order
identified the various statutes which, at that time, provided for the assessment of
administrative penalties. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990, 1003-09 (5th Cir. 1975). As revealed by the very existence of each
of these decisions, court review is available on an administrative penalty order just as it is on
any other final agency action.
"4 Administrative Procedure Act § 554, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994).
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(b) Persons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be
timely informed of-
(1) the time, place, and nature of the hearing;
(2) the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the
hearing is to be held; and
(3) the matters of fact and law asserted.
(c) The agency shall give all interested parties opportunity
for-
(1) the submission and consideration of facts,
arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjustment
when time, the nature of the proceeding and the public
interest permit; and
(2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to
determine a controversy by consent, hearing and decision on
notice and in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this
title. "
In addition, "a party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts."' 6
To "govern all adjudicatory proceedings"1 7 under the environmental
statutes that may result in the Administrator's assessment of a civil penalty
against a violator, the Administrator has lawfully promulgated the
Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties and the Revocation or Suspension of Permits ("the
Administrator's Rules"). 8 When the Administrator, or someone to whom the
Administrator has duly delegated her authority, initiates the exercise of her
power to assess a civil penalty against a violator by issuing a complaint or
proposed administrative order and provides notice to the alleged law violator
of an opportunity for an agency hearing, the Administrator's Rules govern the
'5 Id. § 554.
6 Id. § 556(d).
,7 40 C.F.R. § 22.01(a) (1996).
8 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 22.
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process that follows. 9
In accordance with the Administrator's practice, the Chief
Administrative Law Judge designates an ALJ to serve as "Presiding Officer"
when a request for a hearing is filed.2" The Administrator's Rules provide
that "the Presiding Officer shall conduct a fair and impartial proceeding,
assure that the facts are fully elicited, adjudicate all issues, and avoid delay."'"
" Consistent with the fundamental requirements of fairness and notice, "agencies are free
to fashion their own rules of procedure." Katzson Bros., Inc. v. EPA, 839 F.2d 1396, 1399
(10th Cir. 1988). "[T]he [Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure do not bind administrative
agencies." Id. In Katzson Bros., an alleged law violator argued that it was entitled to notice
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in an administrative penalty action brought by the
U.S. EPA Administrator. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[t]hese rules [the
Consolidated Rules of Practice] and the requirements of due process alone determine whether
EPA's service is proper." Id. That Administrative agencies should be "free to fashion their
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to
discharge their multitudinous duties" is well recognized. Silverman v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Federal Communications
Comm'n v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
In Pottsville Broadcasting, Justice Frankfurter, writing the decision, noted the
historical distinctions in the evolution of court procedure and modem administrative
tribunals. He noted that administrative tribunals "have been a response to the felt need of
governmental supervision over economic enterprise-a supervision which could effectively
be exercised neither directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process."
See Pottsville Broad., 309 U.S. at 142. He further noted that administrative agencies had
been granted powers "far exceeding and different from the conventional judicial modes for
adjusting conflicting claims .... " Id. They have the "power themselves to initiate
inquiry ..... Id. He concluded that "differences in origin and function preclude wholesale
transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the
history and experience of courts" to administrative agencies, and that administrative agencies
"should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry
capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties." Id. at 143.
The "wise admonishment of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that differences in the origin
and function of administrative agencies 'preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of
procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts,"'
was reiterated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)
(quoting Pottsville Broad., 309 U.S. at 143). His admonishment that agencies "should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of
permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties," Pottsville Broad., 309 U.S. at 143,
has been found by the U.S. Supreme Court to be a "very basic tenet of administrative law"
and one which the Court has "continually repeated ... through the years .. " Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544
(1978).
20 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.03 (1996).
2 Id. § 22.04(c).
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The rules also provide specific authority to the Presiding Officer to preside
over different aspects of the litigation.22
The APA sets forth the role and authority of the Presiding Officer as
follows:
(c) Subject to published rules of the agency and within its
powers, employees presiding at hearings may-
(1) administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) issue subpenas [sic] authorized by law;
(3) rule on offers of proof and receive relevant
evidence;
(4) take depositions or have depositions taken when
the ends of justice would be served;
(5) regulate the course of the hearing;
(6) hold conferences for the settlement or
simplification of the issues by consent of the parties;
(7) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;
(8) make or recommend decisions in accordance with
section 557 of this title; and
(9) take other action authorized by agency rule
consistent with this subchapter [5 U.S.C.S. §§ 551 et seq.].23
2 See id.
23 Administrative Procedure Act § 556(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1994). The APA permits
each agency to "appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings
required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of this title" [the APA].
Id. § 3105. In reviewing a forerunner of this section, section 11 of the APA, 60 Stat. 244,
5 U.S.C. § 1010, the Supreme Court recognized that the position of hearing examiner, or
administrative law judge, is "a creature of congressional enactment," and "is not a
constitutionally protected position." Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345
U.S. 128, 133 (1953). Consequently, while an ALJ must "'scrupulously and conscientiously
probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts' . . . [and] [t]he conduct of the
hearing rests generally in the ALJ's discretion[,] ... [o]n matters of law and policy... ALJs
are entirely subject to the agency." Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.
Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). Though not specifically cited by the
Court, statutory authority for this proposition is found in the APA, wherein the enumerated
powers of an ALJ are "[s]ubject to published rules of the agency and within its powers .... "
5 U.S.C. § 556(c). The Administrator's Rules also recognize that the authority of Presiding
Officers, or ALJs, to conduct administrative hearings is "under thse rules of Practice." 40
C.F.R. § 22.04(c)(1) (1996). In rejecting a challenge by seven ALJs to an instruction of the
Chief ALJ of the Social Security Administration to all of the Administration's ALJs, adopting
a new policy on a particular matter, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, while noting that
the instruction did "truncate the administrative law judges discretion[,]" and their "refusal
[Vol. 22:149
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After evidence is taken and arguments are made during a hearing
conducted pursuant to the Administrator's rules, the Presiding Officer issues
and files an "initial decision" that contains: "his findings of fact, conclusions
regarding all material issues of law or discretion, as well as reasons therefor,
a recommended civil penalty assessment, if appropriate, and a proposed final
order."24
The initial decision of the Presiding Officer shall become the
final order of the Environmental Appeals Board within forty-
five (45) days after its service upon the parties and without
further proceedings unless (1) an appeal to the Environmental
Appeals Board is taken from it by a party to the proceedings,
or (2) the Environmental Appeals Board elects, sua sponte, to
review the initial decision.25
By rule, the Administrator has delegated her authority to make final
agency decisions on administrative civil penalty cases to the Environmental
to obey instructions may subject them to disciplinary action[,]" held that "[t]hier proper
course is to obey the instruction and let any claimant injured by it ask the courts to set it
aside." D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1983). The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals has recognized that:
[t]here are, however, definite limits on the extent to which ALJ's may
exercise their decisional independence. Indeed, were it otherwise it might
be difficult for the agency to implement its policies or, in the case of the
SSA, to administer benefits in a fair and consistent manner.
Administrative law judges therefore remain entirely subject to the agency
on matters of law and policy.
Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540-41 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Heckler, 594 F. Supp.
at 1141).
That the ALJs are subject to the agency on matters of law and policy is further
demonstrated by the APA's provisions allowing for appeal from or review of an initial
decision, on which "the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial
decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). This
includes "the authority of agencies to increase sanctions proposed by the AL." Blackfoot
Livestock Comm'n v. Department of Agric., 810 F.2d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
24 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(a) (1996).
25 Id. § 22.27(c). This rule, which addresses the effect of the initial decision of the
Presiding Officer, is consistent with the applicable provisions of the APA, which state that
"[w]hen the presiding employee makes an initial decision, that decision then becomes the
decision of the agency without further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on
motion of, the agency within time provided by rule." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
1997]
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Appeals Board ("the Board").2 6 In publishing this rule, the Administrator
announced that
motions for reconsideration under this provision shall be
directed to, and decided by, the Environmental Appeals
Board. Motions for reconsideration directed to the
Administrator, rather than to the Environmental Appeals
Board, will not be considered, except in cases that the
Environmental Appeals Board has referred to the
Administrator pursuant to § 22.04(a) and in which the
Administrator has issued the final order.27
Consequently, a final decision of the Board becomes a final decision of the
Administrator, subject to judicial review under section 702 of the APA 28 or
under the environmental statute that is the subject of the particular final
agency decision. The Administrator must defend her final decision when it
is reviewed by the Court of Appeals; and, with regard to the penalty assessed,
the Administrator must convince the Court that her final decision assessing
the penalty is not "unwarranted in law or .. .without justification in
fact .... "29
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATOR'S EXERCISE OF HER
AUTHORITY
Once there is a final decision of the Board, either by issuance, or by
operation of 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(c), the Administrator has assessed a civil
penalty against a person whom she has found to have violated an
environmental statute. Her decision is subject to judicial review. Based on
the presumption that no person wants to give up his or her money to the
United States of America, the assessed penalties will have a deterrent effect
on the person paying them and will hopefully cause other potential violators
26 See 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (Feb. 13, 1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 22.04(a)).
27 40 C.F.R. § 22.32. 40 C.F.R. § 22.04(a) provides that the "delegation of authority to
the Environmental Appeals Board does not preclude the Environmental Appeals Board from
referring any case or motion... to the Administrator when the Environmental Appeals
Board ... deems it appropriate to do so." 40 C.F.R. § 22.04(a).
28 See 5 U.S.C. § 702.
29 Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973) (quoting American
Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1946)).
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to bring their activities into compliance with the environmental statutes.3°
A review of the administrative record of any final decision of the
Administrator will reveal that the Administrator, or her delegated authority,
gave notice to the alleged violator of its opportunity to request a hearing prior
to her assessment of the penalty. 3' The record also will reveal that the
Administrator provided the alleged violator an opportunity for a hearing if the
alleged violator so requested. 2
30 See, e.g., Daniel Home, Casenote: Federal Facility Environmental Compliance After
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 631, 632 (1994) (in which
the court assesses a penalty against a federal violator). "Few dispute that punitive fines help
deter violations of environmental laws ... ." Id. The environmental statutes are legislated
by Congress and approved by the President to promote the general welfare of the People and
to protect the People from pollution and environmental harm. See supra note 9.
" See 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.13 and 22.14.
32 An actual evidentiary hearing is not necessary in every case. See In Re Green Thumb
Nursery, Inc., 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,608 (Mar. 6, 1997) wherein a final order
of the Administrator, authored by the Board, held that a person "is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing unless that person puts a material fact at issue," notwithstanding the
environmental statute FIFRA section 14(a)(3) clearly providing an alleged violator an
"opportunity for a hearing," Id. at 40,611.
An accelerated decision, permitted in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 22.20, is a
dispositive pre-trial tool similar in all respects to the "summary judgment" of Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. EPA, 35 F.3d
600, 604-07 (1st Cir. 1994). This tool is especially appropriate in many civil penalty
enforcement actions brought under the Administrator's Rules in that a substantial amount of
the evidence supporting the factual allegations of the Administrator's complaints consists of
"admissions" of the respondent. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, § 56.31[2] (3d ed. 1997). Such admissions include: statements in applications
and notices; monitoring and operating reports of permit holders; facility records, or the lack
thereof, submitted by respondent in answer to an information demand of the Administrator;
admissions implicit in the late filing of required forms, with the information in the form
submitted constituting admissions to facts establishing the applicability of the requirement
to the respondent. See id. (citing several decisions that identify factual situations in which
summary judgment is most appropriate). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that:
There was conflict concerning interpretation of the facts and the ultimate
conclusion to be drawn from them .... But there was none as to the facts
themselves. In other words, the evidentiary facts were not substantially in
dispute .... Conflict concerning the ultimate and decisive conclusion to
be drawn from undisputed facts does not prevent rendition of a summary
judgment, when that conclusion is one to be drawn by the court. The court
had before it all the facts which formal trial would have produced. Going
through the motions of trial would have been futile.
Cody v. Aktiebolaget Flymo, 452 F.2d 1274, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (quoting Fox v. Johnson
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Presumably, the administrative record of the Administrator's final
decision will reveal that everyone involved in the process complied with the
Administrator's Rules. Once again, because the Administrator alone
possesses the authority to assess a civil penalty against violators of an
environmental statute, and because the Administrator must defend her final
order assessing a civil penalty on judicial review, the Administrator maintains
a public duty to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that all those against
whom she has proposed civil penalties are provided the same procedural
rights and subject to the same procedural obligations.33
With regard to the amount of the civil penalty assessed in an initial
decision, which later becomes a final decision of the Administrator by
operation of rule 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(c), or in a final decision of the
Administrator issued by the Board, the administrative record presumably will
reflect that the process complied with the penalty assessment provisions of
the Administrator's Rules.34 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) provides:
& Wimsatt, Inc., 127 F.2d 729, 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). If the evidentiary facts are
undisputed, then the parties can argue, in their briefs, the factual inferences and legal
conclusions they each hope the Presiding Officer will make in the initial decision. Once a
respondent is found to have committed violations, the appropriate penalty amount can be
argued through briefing, unless there are additional contested facts material to some statutory
penalty criteria. A penalty determination results from an analysis of the evidentiary facts and
inferences to be drawn from them in consideration of the statutory penalty criteria. No
"witness" need advise a Presiding Officer on how the case should be decided; that is, no
"witness" need advise the Presiding Officer, through "testimony," on how the evidence
should be analyzed and what conclusions should be drawn based upon the statutory penalty
criteria. See, e.g., Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Marx, the testimony of a securities law expert was found improper and stricken because he
"repeatedly gave his conclusions as to the legal significance of various facts adduced at trial,"
and such testimony "amounts to no more than an expression of the [witness'] general belief
as to how the case should be decided." Id. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 12 at 26-
27).
" The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, citing J. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING
SYSTEM 19 (1978), recognized that:
Perhaps no characteristic of a procedural system is so uniformly
denounced as a tendency to produce inconsistent results. When
disposition depends more on which judge is assigned to the case than on
the facts or the legal rules, the tendency is to describe the system as
lawless, arbitrary, or the like, even though the case assignment is random.
Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1982).
14 See 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) (1996) for the penalty assessment provisions.
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(b) Amount of civil penalty. If the Presiding Officer
determines that a violation has occurred, the Presiding Officer
shall determine the dollar amount of the recommended civil
penalty to be assessed in the initial decision in accordance
with any criteria set forth in the Act relating to the proper
amount of a civil penalty, and must consider any civil penalty
guidelines issued under the Act. If the Presiding Officer
decides to assess a penalty different in amount from the
penalty recommended to be assessed in the complaint, the
Presiding Officer shall set forth in the initial decision the
specific reasons for the increase or decrease. The Presiding
Officer shall not raise a penalty from that recommended to be
assessed in the complaint if the respondent has defaulted.
In numerous cases reviewed on appeal, the Administrator, through the
Board, has upheld civil penalties recommended by ALJs when the ALJs have
complied with the assessment provisions of the Administrator's Rules, and
has set aside ALJ's recommended civil penalties when they have not
complied.35 The final decisions of the Administrator, issued by the Board,
". See, e.g., In re Employers Ins. of Wausau and Group Eight Tech., Inc., 27 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,596 (Feb. 11, 1997); In re Everwood Treatment Co., 26 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,552 (Sept. 27, 1996); In re DIC Americas, Inc., 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 40,428 (Sept. 27, 1995); In re Pacific Ref. Co., 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
40,296 (Dec. 6, 1994).
While United States Tel. Ass 'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding
penalty guidelines issued by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") invalid)
served as a catalyst for a member of the Board to dissent in Pacific Refining, the Board's
subsequent final decisions on behalf of the Administrator, upholding the use of penalty
policies as provided for in 40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b), have been unanimous. Furthermore, there
are substantial distinctions between the FCC assessed penalties which were the subject of
review, and the EPA's procedure for assessing penalties.
The court noted that "[tihe FCC decided in 1991 to abandon its traditional case-by-
case approach to implementing section 503(b) [the imposition of monetary fines for
violations of the Communications Act] and issued an order to 'adopt more specific standards
for assessing forfeitures."' Id. at 1233 (quoting Standards for Assessing Forfeitures, 6
F.C.C.R. 4695 (1991), recon. denied, 7 F.C.C.R. 5339 (1992), modified, 8 F.C.C.R. 6215
(1993)).
The FCC matrix setting out "base forfeiture amounts" consisted of a left hand
column that identified specific title 37 violations. Across the top of the matrix were three
columns, the first was labeled "BC/Cable" (broadcasters and cable operators); the second was
labeled "CC" (common carriers); and the third was labeled "other" (other violators). For the
very same violation, different fine amounts were identified on the matrix for each of the three
1997]
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have consistently identified the value of both complainants and ALJs using
her applicable agency penalty policies, as directed by rule, in determining the
amount of civil penalty in any particular case. The value is that violations
grounded on similar facts will result in similar penalties being assessed. That
is, through the use of such policies as directed, the Administrator can attempt
to assure that civil penalties assessed in her name "are not only appropriate
for the violations committed but are assessed fairly and consistently."36
If there is a reason for assessing a different penalty, notwithstanding
similar facts, then a different penalty can be recommended in the initial
decision. The "Presiding Officer may depart from the policy as long as he or
she considers it and adequately explains the reasons for departing from it."37
The Administrator recognized that:
categories of violators, the amounts of the different fines being determined as a percentage
of the maximum fines allowed by statute for each of the three categories of violators. The
maximum statutory fine for broadcaster/cable operators was $25,000; for common carriers
it was $100,000; and for other service providers it was $10,000. See id.
The court specifically noted an historical record which revealed that the FCC
deviated from imposing the matrix based forfeiture amount against a violator in only one out
of over 300 cases, notwithstanding the FCC's claim that the forfeiture standards were not a
rule and that their application was discretionary. See id. at 1235. The court then noted that
"[tihe Commission appears to wish to avoid grappling with the issue which we noted at the
outset is quite vexing-whether the disparate treatment of different classes of licensees in the
forfeiture schedule is reasonable and authorized under the statute." Id. The court then
identified the specific problem: "[n]either in a direct challenge to the policy nor in an
individual enforcement proceeding, according to the Commission, would common carriers
be entitled to claim that their treatment vis-a-vis broadcasters or other licensees is arbitrary."
Id. at 1235-36. The court then concluded: "The FCC cannot determine that common carriers
as a class will pay heavier fines than other licensees and not explain their reasons for that
position or subject that explanation to judicial review." Id. at 1236.
In contrast to the FCC, any alleged unfairness in a proposed penalty notice issued
by the U.S. EPA Administrator can be challenged in a case-specific proceeding, at the
conclusion of which an ALJ can recommend, in an initial decision, a penalty other than as
calculated under an applicable policy, so long as he or she states the reason for doing so.
See 40 C.F.R. § 22.27 (1996). Also, in contrast to the FCC, the numerical value in the matrix
of U.S. EPA penalty policies is based upon the actual evidence of the violation, with
subsequent adjustments being made based upon evidence regarding the particular violator;
no assessed penalty may be based solely upon the category of violator and title of the
violation.
36 In re DIC Americas, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,429.
"7 In re Everwood Treatment, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,555.
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[U]se of a written policy to assist in developing penalty
proposals should not be presumed to eliminate the exercise of
sound professional judgment from that process; nor should it
be presumed to result in penalty proposals that do not fairly
reflect the circumstances of a particular violation or a
particular violator. To the contrary, fairness in enforcement
might well be better served if penalty proposals are developed
in a regular and consistent manner, such as by consulting a
written policy document, than if those proposals are generated
ad hoc. [Footnote omitted] 8
Thus, with these rules, the Administrator attempts to avoid the ad hoc
and inconsistent results that concerned the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Santise,39 while at the same time allowing for an application of reasoned
discretion to the specific facts of a case. Such an approach differs
considerably from that used by the FCC in assessing its penalties against
violators, which was voided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.4
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the language of the environmental statutes reveals that the
authority to assess administrative civil penalties against violators rests solely
with the Administrator. Consequently, the concomitant duty to exercise this
authority in a fair and consistent manner is with the Administrator and none
other. In recognition of her authority and duty, the Administrator has
promulgated rules of procedure applicable to all who participate in civil
administrative penalty assessment proceedings before her, and has issued,
through the Environmental Appeals Board, final decisions addressing and
interpreting those rules. The rules are intended to provide for one and the
same fair procedure to all; to allow for integrity in her fact-finding process;
and, by requiring reference to the policies and guidance, with their rejection
only when reasons are articulated for doing so, to assure that civil penalties
assessed in her name are fair and consistent, as well as appropriate.
By exercising her lawful authority to assess civil penalties against
those who violate the nation's environmental statutes, the Administrator is
38 In re Employers Insurance, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,604.
'9 676 F.2d 925 (3rd Cir. 1982).
40 See United States Tel. Ass'n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
able to discharge her duty to protect the public health and environment. By
controlling her exercise of that authority through procedural rules and
policies requiring those who act in her name to articulate reasons for
decisions being made in her name, she fulfills her "due process" obligations
to be fundamentally fair to all who appear before her and satisfies her
responsibility to assess civil penalties that are not "unwarranted in law or
without justification in fact."'"
41 Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973) (quoting American
Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 112-13 (1946)).
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